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Abstract: I qualify two criticisms made by commentators on Chapman & Huffman’s target article. 
Responding to the view that differences between humans and other animals are irrelevant to 
deciding how we should treat other species, I point out that differences between any species in 
their capacity to suffer are morally relevant. And in response to the claim that suffering is the sole 
criterion for the moral treatment of animals, I argue that cognitive complexity and a capacity for 
empathy also have moral relevance to the extent that they influence suffering. 
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1. Introduction. My commentary stems from two criticisms of the article by Chapman and 
Huffman (2018) (C & H). The first is that comparisons between humans and other animals of the 
kind discussed by C & H (tool use, self-medication and the building of complex structures) are 
irrelevant to the question of how non-human animals should be treated. This is the crux of 
Broude’s (2019) commentary and is also raised by others (Vonk 2019; Wilson & Lehman 2019; 
Woodruff 2019). Second, it is argued that the only property of animals relevant to their moral 
status is a capacity for suffering. Shackelford (2018) makes this the substance of his comment, 
and other commentaries include the same view (Fawcett & McGreevy 2018; Hood & Giddens 
2019; Paez 2019; Ristau 2018; Vonk 2019; Woodruff 2019). These arguments are similar to my 
own position, but I want to use them as the starting point for some qualifications and 
elaborations. In what follows, when I write of suffering, I take this to include a reduction in positive 
affect or pleasure. 
 
2. Moral relevance of species differences in suffering. Although I agree that comparisons 
between humans and other animals of the kind C & H discuss carry no moral weight, differences 
between any species in the capacity to suffer are clearly of moral relevance, and crucially so when 
choices must be made between actions resulting in suffering to one or another species, or groups 
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of species (see also Fischer 2018). Environmental schemes such as logging and conservation 
programmes, or choices of experimental animals, provide examples.  
 
3. Moral relevance of cognitive complexity and empathy. The degree of moral concern to be 
given to a species depends not only on its capacity to suffer but also, indirectly, on its other 
capabilities that influence this capacity. I am thinking here, particularly, of a species’ cognitive 
complexity and its capacity for empathy (defined as feeling the suffering of others). Although this 
is largely an area of ignorance at present, cognitive complexity may increase suffering through 
the capacity, for example, to predict the repetition of a harmful incident or the continuance of 
current suffering into the future. Empathy is not strictly distinct from suffering, being one 
particular source of suffering. However, I treat it as distinct here for practical reasons, since its 
existence and strength in non-human species is less recognizable than suffering due to harm to 
the self and so may go unrecognized. (Putative evidence of empathy in non-human species is cited 
by Bar-Hen-Schweiger & Henik 2019, and Benz-Schwarzburg 2018.) It is hence useful to give 
empathy special status if we wish to fully understand the capacities of an individual that bear on 
its suffering. None of this is in conflict with the argument that suffering is the ultimate ethical 
criterion for deciding how we should treat other animal species. Cognitive complexity and 
empathy are simply two among perhaps a number of a species’ biology properties that influence 
the degree of suffering experienced for a given external impact. They thus have a moral status. 
The two capacities will also be related if the existence of empathy relies on cognitive complexity. 
 
4. Comparisons with other commentaries. It is worth highlighting the logical structure of these 
arguments in relation to those from earlier commentaries to which they relate. First, I have 
generalized the discussion of differences between humans and non-humans to differences 
between any two species and made the simple point that moral choices will sometimes require 
knowledge of differences between species in their capacity for suffering. In this obvious sense, 
therefore, species differences do have moral relevance. Second, I have argued that capacities of 
the organism that affect its sensitivity to suffering also have moral relevance. Knowledge of 
cognitive complexity and capacity for empathy may help in estimating the suffering likely to ensue 
from human actions. 
 
5. Further thoughts on suffering. In designing advocacy for animal welfare, an emphasis on 
suffering is likely to be more successful in winning hearts and minds than any other argument 
because of the power of suffering to elicit sympathy and empathy. Using suffering as the criterion 
for moral concern does not require further justification, since it represents emotional subjective 
experience. Potential criteria outside the animal’s experience have to win their moral status in 
terms of their reliable impact on suffering and pleasure. There is no moral dilemma in condemning 
purely gratuitous harm. But animal suffering, in almost all cases, is accompanied by what at least 
some people view as benefits to others, generally themselves or other humans. This is where the 
difficult ethical work begins. 
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